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Introduction
What has to be done in order to increase citizen involvement in public affairs?
This article addresses the issue of the publicness of public administration. It argues that
when one wants to have greater involvement of the people in public policy development,
public decision-making and service delivery, one should rethink whether it is really
necessary to reform the public sector internally over and over again and at least rethink
the direction of such reforms. Too often the cause of all problems encountered in
governmental actions is sought in the internal structure of the public administrative
arrangements with the consequence that one has to restructure and reform. Public sector
reform is increasingly conceived as a panacea, a one-size-fits-all solution: ‘Whatever
the problem, administrative reform will solve it’. This article will argue that this is not
necessarily so.
In order to make this claim this article first addresses the different roles of societal
groups in their relation with the government. Societal groups are first of all a target
group of government policies, in which the policies aim to control the behavior of
citizens, business and other societal organizations in order to ensure that they act in
accordance with the laws and regulations as set by the government. Secondly, societal
groups and citizens can be seen as mainly customers receiving public services. But
these are not the only roles possible for societal groups. They can also be seen as
partners in the development of public policies and as interest groups. Why
accomplishing such relations is a win-win situation for citizens as well as policy makers
will be argued next. In order to accomplish such interactions between citizens and their
government one needs specific actions by government taking shape in specific
institutions.
Subsequently the article argues that there have been many reforms in the public
sector over the last two decades of which the main goal was to run society like a
business, and in which the attention for the public was one-sided in seeing citizens only
as customers of public services. First the aim was to make the public sector more
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conform to the principles of New Public Management (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992;
Hood, 1991, Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004, 2011). Since the turn of the millennium new
models have appeared, such as the model of good governance, the neo-Weberian state
and the developmental state (cf. Drechsler, 2005). However, also in these models the
emphasis is on the internal processes of the public sector, in which the role of citizens,
especially in their relation to the public sector as interest groups and partners is rather
limited. Hence, the objectives of the reforms of the last decades fail to reflect any
attention for these two important roles for societal groups vis-à-vis the government.
Last but not least, this article argues that the consequences of the public sector
reforms may well have been counterproductive in this regard, because the reforms have
induced the dominance of an internal orientation among public administrators. An
internal orientation implying that public administrators mainly worry about the
developments within their organization and their own position within the organization
and do care less about the main goal of the organization in relation to solve societal
problems together with societal groups. It will be argued that continuous
reorganizations within the public sector result in the making of a type of public officials
who are constantly worried about their jobs, their working conditions, the changing
relations to their colleagues, and the uncertainty about the new hierarchical relations
within the administration.
Finally it is argued that reforms are likely to result in a standstill in policy
development, an increase in interpersonal conflicts within the administration and
increased conservatism, that is, resistance against a yet another reform within the public
sector, which is the last thing one needs if one wants to improve the public side of
public administration. The argumentation will be backed and illustrated by outcomes of
previous research by the author (De Vries,2002, 2008, 2011, 2012). These
investigations took place mainly in his home-country, i.e. the Netherlands. The
outcomes of this research might well be valid in a wider context, because public sector
reforms have been frequent all over the world (cf. Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011 and
Nolan, 2001 for OECD countries; Weyland, 2007 for Latin America, Beschel et al,
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2013 for Middle East countries; Ayeni et al, 2003 and Bangura and Larbi, 2006 for
developing countries and Nemec and De Vries, 2012a for reforms in countries in
Central and Eastern Europe).
The publicness of the public sector
Four roles for societal groups in their relation with government
Interactions between government and societal groups are primarily characterized
by power and interests. These two concepts determine who is included and excluded
from the policy-making process and how and why actors are included or excluded. It
refers to the congruence/ antagonism of interests between policy makers and societal
groups, and the extent to which their mutual relations are hierarchical. This results in
four possible forms of interactive policy making. Of course this is an ideal-type
distinction. In practice all kinds of mixed forms might be visible.
Table 1. Four types of interaction between government and societal groups
(dis)parity of power and authority
Hierarchical Horizontal
Antagonism
Type A
Societal groups as target
groups
Government steers
hierarchically
Type C
Societal groups as interest
groups
Resolution of conflicting
interests
Perceived
Interests
Congruence
Type B
Societal groups as clients
Government provides services
Type D
Societal groups as partners
Government becomes
governance
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The first design, type A, treats societal groups as target groups. The policy makers
are dominant and fear that without their interference the population might act in
undesirable ways. The policies are intended to make undesirable behavior less likely
and desirable behavior more likely. In this way order and stability is maintained and
societal problems can be resolved. It is because of the basic assumption that people
might show unwanted behavior that a presumed antagonism between policy makers and
population forms the point of departure in the policy making process. Given the powers
invested in the politicians and the bureaucratic policy makers, the participation of
societal groups is minimal. Policies are directed toward steering the behavior of the
latter and not at getting consensus, which is hard to expect anyway if people have
different interests.
Type B assumes that the interests between policy makers and societal groups are
congruent. People as well as policy makers want quick, effective, efficient and well
thought-out service delivery by the public sector. We all want our passports and
driver’s license as well as our permits to be delivered the same day we ask for them. In
this case, it is about government as a service provider in which people in all their
different roles are the clients. Underlying this model is a hierarchical relation, based on
the relation between on the one side the service provider, in public services often a
monopolist, and on the other hand the client being simultaneously voter and customer,
but in this model seen first and foremost as the client. It is the client who might not be
satisfied with the service delivery, in which case it is in the interest of the service
provider and client that the service delivery is to be improved and opportunities are
created to utter complaints.
Type C still departs from antagonism in interests, but the relations between policy
makers and societal groups are less hierarchical. The latter try to influence the policy
making process, and are involved in such processes because it is recognized that policy
outcomes may be profitable for some groups while being harmful to others. Hence, the
dominant view is that one has to deliberate and allow for participation by different
societal groups before decisions are made in order to mitigate the possibly
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disadvantageous impacts. In fact this type of interactive policy making involves
different policies. It is not about the crook having a say in the conviction, but it’s about
the ‘citoyen’having a say in policies which might be good for economic development,
but not for the environment and vice versa.
Finally, type D is characterized by congruence of interests and equivalency in
the mutual relations. It is what nowadays is depicted ‘governance’, referring to
all organizations and institutions that are involved in the structuring of society,
including governmental as well as non-governmental actors and independent
agencies, without anyone being dominant (Raadschelders, 2003: 4), and central
in modern day analyses of policy networks.
Why involve the public in other ways than just as a target group or customers?
The last decades have emphasized type A and B interactions, that is, seeing
societal groups as customers and target groups respectively, implying a hierarchical
relation between the service provider/ rule-maker and the population. The improvement
of the actions involved is, of course, necessary and a lot has deservedly been done to
improve the relations in this respect. However, there are many reasons to involve
societal groups in policy processes also as partners and interest groups. The most
important reasons therefore are that such interactions are basic to good governance, that
it increases the stability of the system and that the quality of the policies developed
increases (cf. De Vries, 2008).
First of all, it has everything to do with democracy (Linder, 1994). Policies which
have an effect on groups in society have to be supported by these groups. It belongs to
basic democratic rights that citizens can indirectly and directly influence, participate in
and co-produce policy-making processes.
Second, it has to do with the stability of the political system. Support for the
political system is next to the demands placed on it one of the most important inputs,
which determines in the short or long run the viability of the political system. Trying to
obtain external support does not slow down the policy-making process as is often
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thought but may well reduce the time necessary to progress from identifying a policy
problem, to developing a policy, making a decision about it and implementing the
policy. Complex decision-making processes may well be speeded up if stakeholders are
continuously involved at each step (Dukes, 1996; Susskind and Field, 1996). The
alternative of neglecting public support at the beginning of the policy process often
results in resistance and delays in later stages of the process.
Support for policies also increases support for the policy-makers themselves. The
elected ones, in particular, gain in the probability of being re-elected. It is clear that
when the policies they have proposed, enacted and implemented are judged favorably
by the public in general, the public will be more inclined to re-elect them. Furthermore,
external support and ‘co-production’ prevent paternalism. People are more susceptible
to recommendations when they have been involved in the process which resulted in the
recommendations than when the recommendation has been dictated to them. According
to Terry (1995), public administrators need external as well as internal support. They
have to maintain a favorable public image and should (internally) bind parochial group
egotism to larger loyalties and aspirations (see also Perrow, 1961; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). External support for policies results in a favorable public image which is crucial
for success (Terry, 1995: 146). Perrow pointed at the necessity of a predominantly
favorable public image which, in his words, translates into ‘prestige’ which, in turn,
increases the likelihood that administrative agencies will continue to secure vital
resources from the external environment (Perrow, 1961: 335; Terry, 1995: 146).
Policies also tend to become better and more moderate in a qualitative sense if
they are co-produced by the policy-makers and the target groups. The variety of ideas
implies that more information is gathered and taken into account before reaching a
decision. The transparency of the policy is also enhanced and therefore its
controllability and accountability. As such, public participation is a strong form of
‘checks and balances’. It ensures that policies are better thought through, well-argued
and legitimate. In this regard it is important to note that public participation can result
in a decrease in the ambiguity policy-makers might face. As March and Feldman
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argued, policy problems and solutions often suffer from ambiguity about the concepts.
The main problem is often the differing interpretations and valuations of the problem at
stake and then the policy-making process becomes a process of issue interpretation.
The importance of this point is especially seen in redistributive policies where the
distribution of the benefits and costs over different groups in society is at stake. To seek
support from all involved parties will result in a more reasonable distribution of the
costs and benefits over advantaged and disadvantaged groups in society. Lindblom
(1965) calls this the ‘potential intelligence of democracy’. Public participation may
have an intended side-effect on increased knowledge of all participants. It may reduce
the risk of violent confrontation and may make it clear which options to consider and
why options are considered (Dukes, 1996: 64).
The needed institutions for involving societal groups as partners and interest
groups
What is helpful in achieving such public participation is the creation of institutions.
The emphasis and neglect of the four types of interaction can be seen in the emphasis
and neglect in building and extending the functions of specific institutions. An
overview thereof is seen in table 2.
Table 2. Four types of interaction between societal groups and government and the
functions of specific institutions
Societal groups
as target groups
Societal groups
as clients
Societal groups
as interest groups
Societal groups
as partners
Procedural
measures
Extensive
regulation
Maintenance by
sanctions.
Simplification of
regulation,
deregulation,
language
improvement,
redesign of forms,
cutting red tape.
Staff training to
enhance
efficiency
Regulation to
insure
democratization.
Laws on work
councils.
Public inquiry
proc.
Constitutional
rights,
freedom of press
Negotiated
agreements
instead of laws.
Self-regulation.
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Information
Measures
Registration.
Socio-graphic and
demographic
research.
Information as
means of
government
control.
Polls on client
satisfaction
Advertising,
brochures, guides,
public relations.
Advice, surveys,
focus- groups.
Information as
communication
service.
Freedom of
inform.
Hearings, public
meetings,
community
outreach,
committees,
forums, referenda.
Information as a
right for societal
groups.
Deliberation.
Joint project
teams, lobbying,
negotiation.
Information as
means for mutual
understanding.
Consultative
Measures
In order to get
more insight into
effectiveness of
policies, the need
for new
regulations, and
control.
In order to get
feedback from
consumers with a
view to
improving
services.
In order to
confront different
interests.
In order to know
where interests
meet and win-win
situation can be
created.
Institutional
measures
National
statistical and
planning
agencies.
Ombudsmen.
Special
commissions.
Work councils.
Appeal courts,
tribunals.
Consultative
bodies.
National boards.
Restructuring
measures
Standardization Deregulation,
one-shop system.
Democratization. Privatization.
Public private
partnerships.
The table gives an overview of which regulations and laws are made and
emphasized in order to induce one of the four forms of interaction between the
government and societal groups, the procedural measures, what information is gathered
by government and why – the informational measures; why the societal groups are
consulted and in which way – consultative measures, what institutions are build – the
institutional measures and what is the main objective of all the measures –the
restructuring measures.
For instance, regarding the first row, when government sees societal groups as
target groups, procedural measures are introduced to regulate and sanction them, to tell
them what is allowed and what is forbidden. When societal groups are seen as
customers the emphasis is on simplification of regulation, deregulation, regulations to
improve the language used by public administrators, the redesign of forms, cutting red
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tape and staff training to enhance speed and efficiency of service delivery. But when
societal groups are seen as interest groups or partners, procedures emphasize the need
for negotiation and self-regulation and regulation is to ensure democratic processes
such as given in laws on work councils, public inquiries, constitutional rights and
freedom of the press.
The absent publicness of public sector reforms
Above it was explained that there are different ways in which the relations
between societal groups and government can be conceived. Below it will be argued that
the public sector reforms as seen in the last decades one-sidedly emphasized the role of
societal groups as customers and target groups respectively, neglecting and even being
counterproductive for societal groups’ role as interest groups and partners. This is
firstly seen in the goals of these reforms and secondly in the unintended consequences
of the reforms.
The goals of public sector reforms in the last three decades
The main trend in public sector reform has been in the direction of New Public
Management of which the basic idea is that society should be run like a business.
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) wanted to reinvent US government in order that it works
better and costs less. Their ideas on New Public Management were summarized in
Denhart (2004: 136) under ten principles: Government under NPM should by catalytic
(steering rather than rowing), community-owned (empowering rather than serving);
competitive by injecting competition into service delivery, mission-driven instead of
rule-driven, results-oriented, customer-driven, enterprising, anticipatory, decentralized
and market-oriented. This view on the public sector is based on a very critical stance
towards it. One has to leave the rowing to those organizations that know how to deliver
services, i.e. the free market. Society would be better off if the public sector as such
would be downsized and the number of public officials could be decreased by
privatization, outsourcing and economic liberalization. At approximately the same time
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Hood (1991) identified as typical for New Public Management as it developed in the
UK elements such as hands-on management, performance measures, emphasis on
output and controls that objectives are met, disaggregation of and competition within
the public sector, copying private sector management styles and input discipline (Hood,
1991). Public services could be in the hands of the public sector if only the way they are
delivered would be improved, i.e., if it would be more product instead of function-
oriented, if internally it would become merit-based and careers would be organized on a
professional instead of formal-legal basis, if management-objectives would become
dominant over legal arrangements, if mobility would increase and flexible work
contracts would replace seniority principles, if the bureaucratic ethos would disappear
and the emphasis would be on the quality of service delivery and e-government. Both
interpretations of NPM emphasize the crucial role of efficient and speedy service
delivery, thus emphasizing the role of societal groups as customers of those services.
Essential were improvements such as deregulation, development of one-shop systems,
of performance measures measuring client satisfaction and the productivity of the
public sector, and giving information as a communication service to the clients. It one-
sidedly interprets the values and norms of the public sector as the added value in
economic terms and the norms as set by performance indicators instead of
understanding these in terms of ethics, integrity and basic moral values.
Since a couple of years there have been alternatives for this reform model,
especially in the good governance model, the developmental state model and the neo-
Weberian state model. In the developmental state model it is all about giving priority to
protect the national economy and especially its core industry. It emphasizes protection
of domestic industry over foreign direct investments, technology transfer instead of
capital transfer, a capable state apparatus over privatization, corporatism instead of the
strict divide between public and private sector, output legitimacy (effectiveness) over
input legitimacy (efficiency) and economic growth over political reform. However, the
citizens in their role of interest groups or partners are hardly mentioned in this model.
That is to a lesser degree, but still predominantly the case for the so-called Neo
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Weberian state model which emphasizes a rather different approach than NPM, but still
pays hardly any attention to the role of citoyen. This model calls for a reaffirmation of
the role of the state as the main facilitator of solutions to the new problems, of
representative democracy as the legitimating element, of administrative law in
preserving the basic principles, and of the idea of a public service with a distinct status
and culture. It is called Neo, because of its ‘neo’ elements such as a shift from an
internal towards external orientation, consultation with citizens, a modernization of the
relevant laws, to encourage a greater orientation on the achievements of results rather
than merely the correct following of procedure, and the professionalization of the public
service (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004; Drechsler, 2005). It is still very process oriented
with as the main distinction to NPM that it recognizes the unique character of the public
sector. But it are all still just deliberate attempts to change the structure and
processes of public sector organizations with the objective of getting them run
better” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011).
This is especially the case for the good governance agenda in which government is
asked to do what it is supposed to do instead of leaving this to market forces, that is,
create security, protect property rights, reduce societal problems and take back its
leading role in controlling and steering societal developments, but the criteria according
to which good governance is distinguished from bad governance are mainly procedural.
These include legitimacy and voice, direction (including strategic vision), performance
(including responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency), accountability (including
transparency) and fairness (including equity and rule of law).
Although the alternatives for NPM leave some more room for the participatory
role of societal groups, the attention therefore is still somewhat meager. They still don’t
talk about co-production, enhancing direct democracy, taking into account conflicting
interests when developing new policies nor do they pay sufficient attention to the need
of more horizontal relations between state and society instead of pure hierarchy.
The unintended effects of the reforms
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As serious as the lack of intentions to enhance the role of civic society in public
policy processes in the reforms mentioned is that the actual reforms that did take place
had effects which are counterproductive in this regard. Especially when organizations
experience repeated reforms this is detrimental for the much needed external orientation
of its employees towards society instead of internally towards their organization and
their own position. The basic model in which these unintended effects are presented is
given in figure 1.
The literature on the unintended consequences of continues reforms shows that
such processes go hand in hand with uncertainty, physical, emotional and psychological
strain among the employees in the organization, because during reorganizations
positions are shuffled around, colleagues even subordinates may become bosses and
bosses can be degraded, pushed aside or even fired, resulting in new and unknown
relationships. The second way in which reorganizations result in uncertainty is because
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reorganizations can be seen as a violation of the psychological contract, e.g. “the
actions employees believe are expected of them and what response they expect in return
from the employer” (Wellin, 2007: 27). Pollard (2001) found that workplace
reorganization causes significant increases in distress and in systolic blood pressure and
that uncertainty contributes to these effects.
As a consequence of the uncertainty, threats and physical problems amongst
employees caused by reorganizations, indirect effects of reorganizations are also likely
to occur. Several authors pointed to the probability that reorganizations may affect the
work morale, such as shown in pride, public service motivation, affection towards the
organization and job satisfaction. This is the case, among other things, because they
force employees to shift attention from their daily work to organizational developments
and to check whether the reorganization will affect the nature of their work and
working conditions. Especially when employees perceive the outcomes of the reform as
unjust for themselves, they are more likely to leave their jobs, are less likely to
cooperate, show lower levels of morale and higher levels of work stress and overt and
covert disobedience, are more likely to initiate lawsuits, and may even start behaving in
anti-social ways.
A second probable indirect effect of reorganizations is found in the inclination of
employees to prevent further reorganizations and reforms. One might expect them to
show conservatism, or in terms of the rationalities distinguished by Max Weber to
adhere more and more to a traditional rationality. Preferring the way things are arranged
at present even though further reforms might be advantageous to their organization.
A third probable indirect consequence of reorganizations is that interpersonal
relations between public administrators become disturbed. Previous research pointed to
the probability that such conflicts are related to characteristics of the context in which
people are employed (cf. Waite Miller, Malis & Roloff, 2009). Important for our
research is that it was pointed out that especially hectic and dynamism in the work
environment are causes of interpersonal conflicts (Marcellisen, 1988). Furthermore, if
there are large power differences it becomes harder to arrive at solutions and conflicts
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are more persistent (Kriesberg, 1993). This is especially the case when dominant
positions are in dispute and ambiguous (Smyth, 1994), when power shifts occur, or
otherwise fundamental changes take place in the context (Putnam & Wodolleck, 2003),
and especially if the workplace is perceived as chaotic (Crocker, Hampson & Aall,
2004). Especially reorganizations may have the side-effect that they result in a division
within the organization between people who profit from and people who are
disadvantaged by the change. As said above, reorganizations may result in (temporary)
uncertainty and ambiguity about the new situation and consequently result in behavioral
mistakes by individual public officials, which in turn can be interpreted by others as
resistance to the new situation the newly established hierarchy, thus resulting in an
interpersonal conflict between public officials (cf. de Vries, 2012). For the Netherlands
the author found clear evidence that these effects do indeed result from frequent and
repeated reorganizations (de Vries, 2011, 2012).
Conclusions
This article addressed the problems involved in constructing a civil society which
actively participates in public policy development and decision-making. It pointed
especially at the unintended but nevertheless detrimental effects of the reforms and
subsequent reorganizations as witnessed in the last decades. It was argued that
especially reforms in the name of New Public Management are one-sided in that they
emphasize civil society’s role only as client or customer of public service delivery.
Besides the role of customer civil society can also be conceived as a target group of
public policies, a composition of interest groups or as a partner in the coproduction of
policies. Especially these last two roles were neglected in the last decades resulting in a
civil society that is only allowed to say that government service delivery can be faster
and better, but is unable to interact as ‘citoyen’with government in order to say they
want different policies, attention for major problems and what is in their interest besides
the basic services.
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Furthermore, it was argued that the reorganizations resulting from the reforms may
have had the effect that public officials turned away from society and were mainly
internally oriented at their jobs, position and the position of the organization they work
for. This is a consequence of the direction of such reforms, but also of the frequency
with which reorganizations occur.
As a scholar working in academia it may not be possible to achieve that the
reforms and reorganizations, which are repeated again and again, do indeed stop. Our
profession lacks political power, but we can and must speak truth to power. The main
message is therefore: “If you want an active civil society with a mature relationship
between government and civil society, in which both can express their interests on an
equal basis with the goal to make for a better society, stop the repeated public sector
reforms”. These reforms are only aimed at optimizing the internal workings of the
public sector and at repeatedly changing the inter- and intra-governmental arrangements
and not at involving societal groups in any way. These reorganizations also result in
uncertainty and physical, emotional and psychological strain among the public
employees and have a negative impact on their external orientation and public service
motivation, result in more interpersonal conflicts within the public sector and into
increased conservatism. Therefore, stop it!
The public sector and civil society: A somewhat neglected issue in public sector reforms
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